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Motivation
• Vast literature linking income distribution with:
– Policy Choices (Philip Keefer and Stuti Khemani)
– Education (Gerhard Gloom and B. Ravikumar)
– Economic Performance (Simons Kuznets)
– Growth (Roberto Perotti)
• Empirical and Theoretical literature on:
– Link between public investment/public capital and 
economic growth (David Alan Aschauer)
Motivation
• Try to bridge the two branches of literature:
– There is a documented negative impact of income distribution 
on growth (Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik)
– Can governments, through public investment, mitigate this 
negative impact?
• There is some empirically evidence of a 
relation between income distribution, 
government quality and government size
The model
• Framework of an exogenous growth model
• Government
– Ht = θτKpt
– Kgt + δgKgt = (1- θ)τ Kpt
– qt = (Kgt / Lt)ψ
• Production
– Yt = AKαptLt1- α(Htqt)β
.
.
.
Ht stands for government spending
Kgt is public capital
qt stands for government quality
The model
• Consumer side of the problem:
– Each individual is indexed by a relative factor endowment:
– Individual income:
– The utility function is given by: 
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σ High σ: individual is capital poor; Low σ
individual is capital rich. In a equalitarian 
society σ =1. In the real world σm>1.
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Decentralized problem 
• Consumers solve the following problem:
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Decentralized problem 
• Solving the previous problem, in a balanced 
growth path with constant returns to scale on 
private and public capital we will have:
• The tax rate that maximizes growth
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Individual i preferred tax rate
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Individual i preferred tax rate
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Proposition: The less capitalist an individual is the higher 
will is preferred tax rate be.
Proposition: The lower the government saving rate is the 
higher will be individual i preferred tax rate.
Policy choice
• We have a Condorcet winner that is the median 
voter tax rate
• This tax rate will be higher than the optimal one
• Can government chose its own saving rate in order 
to diminish this distance?
Choices of θ
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Conclusions
• The economy’s growth rate has an inverted U-
shape relation with the tax rate
• Each individual has only one tax rate that 
maximizes it’s utility. The more capital poor an 
individual is the higher will is preferred tax rate be.
• There is a condorcet winner which is the tax rate 
chosen by the median voter
Conclusions
• The more unequal a society is, the bigger the
distance between the chosen tax rate and the
optimal one
• With the manipulation of θ governments can
reduce this distance and approximate the actual 
growth rate from the potential one
• This manipulation has to take in consideration that
lowering θ has a negative impact on potential
growth.
Conclusions
• We have also concluded that the positive 
relation between θ and τ is sensitive to the 
parameters of the model. Larger tax rates 
will be obtain if: 
– We have more weight of the public sector on 
the production function
– We have a more uneven society
– We have a larger discount rate
Further Work
• Try to find the exact level of θ that allows 
the choice of the tax rate that maximizes 
growth
• Confirm empirically if this results have 
effective correspondence to reality
